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Abstract
Imitating successful behavior is a natural and frequently applied approach to trust in when facing sce-
narios for which we have little or no experience upon which we can base our decision. In this paper, we
consider such behavior in atomic congestion games. We propose to study concurrent imitation dynamics
that emerge when each player samples another player and possibly imitates this agents’ strategy if the an-
ticipated latency gain is sufficiently large. Our main focus is on convergence properties. Using a potential
function argument, we show that our dynamics converge in a monotonic fashion to stable states. In such a
state none of the players can improve its latency by imitating somebody else.
As our main result, we show rapid convergence to approximate equilibria. At an approximate equilib-
rium only a small fraction of agents sustains a latency significantly above or below average. In particular,
imitation dynamics behave like fully polynomial time approximation schemes (FPTAS). Fixing all other
parameters, the convergence time depends only in a logarithmic fashion on the number of agents.
Since imitation processes are not innovative they cannot discover unused strategies. Furthermore, strate-
gies may become extinct with non-zero probability. For the case of singleton games, we show that the
probability of this event occurring is negligible. Additionally, we prove that the social cost of a stable state
reached by our dynamics is not much worse than an optimal state in singleton congestion games with linear
latency function. Finally, we discuss how the protocol can be extended such that, in the long run, dynamics
converge to a Nash equilibrium.
1 Introduction
We study imitation dynamics that emerge if myopic players concurrently imitate each other in order to im-
prove on their own situation. In scenarios for which players have little or no experience upon which they can
base their decisions, or in which precise knowledge about the available options and their consequences is ab-
sent, it is a good strategy to imitate successful behavior. Thus, it is not surprising that such imitating behavior
can frequently be observed, and has already been studied intensively in economics and game theory [20, 27].
We analyze such imitation dynamics in the context of symmetric congestion games [24]. As an example
of such a game consider a network congestion game in which players strive to allocate paths with minimum
latency between the same source-sink pair in a network. The latency of a path equals the sum of the latencies
of the edges in that path and the latency of an edge depends on the number of players sharing it.
∗This work was in part supported by the DFG through German UMIC-excellence cluster at RWTH Aachen University.
†Supported by an NSERC grant. Part of this work was done while author visited RWTH Aachen University.
‡Supported by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) within the PostDoc-Program.
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We consider a simple imitation rule according to which players strive to improve their individual latencies
over time by imitating others in a concurrent and round-based fashion. This IMITATION PROTOCOL has
several appealing properties: it is simple, stateless, based on local information, and is compatible with the
selfish incentives of the players. The IMITATION PROTOCOL consists of a sampling and a migration step.
First, each player samples another player uniformly at random. Then he considers the latency gain that he
would have by adopting the strategy of the sampled player, under the assumption that no-one else changes
his strategy. If this latency gain is not too small our player adopts the sampled strategy with a migration
probability mainly depending on the anticipated latency gain. The major technical challenge in designing
such a concurrent protocol is to avoid overshooting effects. Overshooting occurs if too many players sample
other players currently using the same strategy, and if all of them migrate towards it. In this case their latency
might be greater than before the migration. In order to avoid overshooting, the migration probabilities have
to be defined appropriately without sacrificing the benefit of concurrency. We propose to scale the migration
probabilities by the elasticity of the latency functions in order to avoid overshooting. The elasticity of a
function at point x describes the proportional growth of the function value as a result of a proportional growth
of its argument. Note that in case of polynomial latency functions with positive coefficients and maximum
degree d the elasticity is upper bounded by d.
A natural solution concept in this scenario is imitation-stability. A state is imitation-stable if no more
improvements are possible based on the IMITATION PROTOCOL. We analyse convergence properties with
respect to this solution concept.
1.1 Our Results
As our first result we prove that the IMITATION PROTOCOL succeeds in avoiding overshooting effects and
converges in a monotonic fashion (Section 3). More precisely, we show that a well-known potential function
(Rosenthal [24]) decreases on expectation as long as the system is not yet at an imitation-stable state. Thus,
the potential is a super-martingale and eventually reaches a local minimum, corresponding to an imitation-
stable state. Hence, as a corollary, we see that an imitation-stable state is reached in pseudopolynomial time.
Our main result, presented in Section 4, however, is a much stronger bound on the time to reach approx-
imate imitation-stable states. What is a natural definition of approximately stable states in our setting? By
repeatedly sampling other agents, an agent gets to know the average latency of the system. It is approxi-
mately satisfied, if it does not sustain a latency much larger than the average. Hence, we say that a state is
approximately stable if almost all agents are almost satisfied. More precisely, we consider states in which at
most a δ-fraction of the agents deviates by more that an ǫ-fraction (in any direction) from the average latency.
We show that the expected time to reach such a state is polynomial in the inverse of the approximation pa-
rameters δ and ǫ as well as in the maximum elasticity of the latency functions, and logarithmic in the ratio
between maximum and minimum potential. Hence, if the maximum latency of a path is fixed, the time is
only logarithmic in the number of players and independent of the size of the strategy space and the number
of resources.
We complement these results by various lower bounds. First, it is clear that pseudopolynomial time is
required to reach exact imitation-stable states. This follows from the fact that there exist states in which
all latency improvements are arbitrarily small, resulting in arbitrarily small migration probabilities. Hence,
already a single step may take pseudopolynomially long. As a concept of approximate stable states one could
have required all agents to be approximately satisfied, rather than only all but a δ-fraction. This, however,
would require to wait a polynomial number of rounds for the last agent to become approximately satisfied,
as opposed to our logarithmic bound. Finally, we consider sequential imitation processes in which only one
agent may move at a time. We extend a construction from [1] to show that there exist instances in which the
shortest sequence of imitations that leads to an imitation-stable state is exponentially long.
The IMITATION PROTOCOL has one drawback: It is not innovative in the following sense. It might happen
with small but non-zero probability that all players currently using the same strategy P migrate towards other
strategies and no other player migrates towards P . In this case, the knowledge about the existence of strategy
P is lost and cannot be regained. For singleton games, i. e., games in which each strategy is a singleton set,
in which empty links have latency zero, we show in Section 5 that the probability of this event occurring in
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a polynomial number of rounds is negligible. This also has an important consequence: The cost of a state
to which the IMITATION PROTOCOL converges is, on expectation, not much worse than the cost of a Nash
equilibrium. More precisely, we show for the case of linear latency functions that the expected cost of a state
to which the IMITATION PROTOCOL converges is within a constant factor of the optimal solution.
We conclude with a discussion of a possible extension of the IMITATION PROTOCOL in Section 6. In
cases, in which convergence to a Nash equilibrium is required, it is possible to adjust the dynamics and
occasionally let players use an EXPLORATION PROTOCOL. Using such a protocol, players sample other
strategies directly instead of sampling them by looking at other players. We show that a suitable definition of
such a protocol and a suitable combination with the IMITATION PROTOCOL guarantee convergence to Nash
equilibria in the long run.
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first work that considers concurrent protocols for atomic conges-
tion games that are not restricted to parallel links and linear latency functions.
1.2 Related Work
Rosenthal [24] proves that every congestion game possesses a Nash equilibrium, and that better response
dynamics converge to Nash equilibria. In these dynamics players have complete knowledge, and, in every
round, only a single player deviates to a better strategy than it currently uses. Fabrikant et al. [11], however,
observe that, in general, from an appropriately chosen initial state it takes exponentially many steps until
players finally reach an equilibrium. This negative result still holds in games with ǫ-greedy players, i. e., in
games in which players only deviate if their latency decreases by a relative factor of at least 1 + ǫ [1, 7, 26].
Moreover, Fabrikant et al. [11] prove that, in general, computing a Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete. Their
result still holds in the case of asymmetric network congestion games. In addition, Skopalik and Vo¨cking [26]
prove that even computing an approximate Nash equilibrium is PLS-complete. On the positive side, best
response dynamics converge quickly in singleton and matroid congestion games [1, 21]. Additionally, Chien
and Sinclair [7] consider the convergence time of best response dynamics to approximate Nash equilibria in
symmetric games. They prove fast convergence to approximate Nash equilibria provided that the latency of
a resource increases by at most a factor for each additional user. Finally, Goldberg [18] considers a protocol
applied to a scenario where n weighted users assign load to m parallel links and the latency equals the load of
a resource. In this protocol, randomly selected players move sequentially, and migrate to a randomly selected
resource if this improves their latency. The expected time to reach a Nash equilibrium is pseudopolynomial.
Results considering other protocols and links with latency functions are presented in [9]
The social cost of (approximate) Nash equilibria in congestion games has been subject to numerous stud-
ies. The most prominent concept has been the price of anarchy [22], which is the ratio of the worst cost of any
Nash equilibrium over the cost of an optimal assignment. Roughgarden and Tardos [25] conducted the first
study of general, non-atomic congestion games and showed a tight bound of 4/3 for the price of anarchy with
linear latency functions. For atomic games and linear latencies, Awerbuch et al. [2] and Christodoulou and
Koutsoupias [8] show a tight bound of 2.5. The special case of (weighted) singleton games has been of partic-
ularly strong interest, and we refer the reader to [23, chapter 20] for an introduction to the numerous results.
In terms of dynamics, Awerbuch et al. [3] consider the number of best-response steps required to reach a
desirable state, which has a social cost only a constant factor larger than that of a social optimum. They show
that even in congestion games with linear latencies there are exponentially long best-response sequences for
reaching such a desirable state. In contrast, Fanelli et al. [12] show that for linear latency functions there are
also much faster best response sequences that reach a desirable state after at most Θ(n log logn) steps.
Recently, concurrent protocols have been studied in various models and under various assumptions. Even-
Dar and Mansour [10] consider concurrent protocols in a setting where the links have speeds. However, their
protocols require global knowledge in the sense that the users must be able to determine the set of underloaded
and overloaded links. Given this knowledge, the convergence time is doubly logarithmic in the number of
players. In [4] the authors consider a distributed protocol for the case that the latency equals the load that does
not rely on this knowledge. Their bounds on the convergence time are also doubly logarithmic in the number
of players but polynomial in the number of links. In [5] the results are generalized to the case of weighted
jobs. In this case, the convergence time is only pseudopolynomial, i. e., polynomial in the number of users,
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links, and in the maximum weight. Finally, Fotakis et al. [17] consider a scenario with latency functions for
every resource. Their protocol involves local coordination among the players sharing a resource. For the
family of games in which the number of players asymptotically equals the number of resources they prove
fast convergence to almost Nash equilibria. Intuitively, an almost Nash equilibrium is a state in which there
are not too many too expensive and too cheap resources. In [13], a load balancing scenario is considered in
which no information about the target resource is available. The authors present an efficient protocol in which
the migration probability depends purely on the cost of the currently selected strategy.
In [15] the authors consider congestion games in the Wardrop model, where an infinite population of
players carries an infinitesimal amount of load each. They consider a protocol similar to ours and prove that
with respect to approximate equilibria it behaves like an FPTAS, i. e., it reaches an approximate equilibrium
in time polynomial in the approximation parameters and the representation length of the instance (e. g., if the
latency functions are polynomials in coefficient representation). In contrast to our work the analysis of the
continuous model does not have to take into account probabilistic effects.
Our protocol is based on the notion of imitation, a concept frequently applied in evolutionary game theory.
For an introduction to imitation dynamics, see, e g., [20, 27].
2 Congestion Games and Imitation Dynamics
In this section, we provide a formal description of our model. We define congestion games in terms of
networks, that is, the strategy space of each player corresponds to the set of paths connecting a particular
source-sink pair in a network. However, our results are independent of this definition and still hold in general,
symmetric congestion games. Furthermore, we introduce the slope and the elasticity of latency functions, and
give a precise definition of the IMITATION PROTOCOL.
2.1 Symmetric Network Congestion Games
A symmetric network congestion game is a tuple (G, (s, t),N , (ℓe)e∈E), where G = (V,E) denotes a net-
work with vertices V and m directed edges E, and s ∈ V and t ∈ V denote a source and a sink vertex.
Furthermore, N denotes a set of n agents or players, and (ℓe)e∈E a family of non-decreasing and differ-
entiable latency functions ℓe : R≥0 → R≥0. We assume that for all e ∈ E, the latency functions satisfy
ℓe(x) > 0 for all x > 0. The strategy space of all players equals the set of paths P connecting the source s
with the sink t. If G consists of two nodes s and t only, which are connected by a set of parallel links, then
we call the game a singleton game. A state x of the game is a vector (xP )P∈P where xP denotes the number
of players utilizing path P in state x, and xe =
∑
P∋e xP is the congestion of edge e ∈ E in state x. The
latency of edge e in state x is given by ℓe(xe), and the latency of path P ∈ P is
ℓP (x) =
∑
e∈P
ℓe(xe) .
The latency of a player is the latency of the path it chooses.
For brevity, for all P ∈ P , let 1P denote the m-dimensional unit vector with the one in position P . In
state x a player has an incentive to switch from path P to path Q if this would strictly decrease its latency,
i. e., if
ℓP (x) > ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P ) .
If no player has an incentive to change its strategy, then x is at a Nash equilibrium. It is well known [24], that
the set of Nash equilibria corresponds to the set of states that minimize the potential function
Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E
xe∑
i=1
ℓe(i) .
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In the following, let Φ∗ = minxΦ(x) be the minimum potential. Note that due to our definition of the latency
functions Φ∗ > 0. For every path P ∈ P let
ℓ+P (x) = ℓP (x+ 1P ) .
Note that for every path Q ∈ P
ℓ+P (x) ≥ ℓP (x + 1P − 1Q) .
Additionally, let
Lav(x) =
∑
P∈P
xP
n
ℓP (x)
denote the average latency of the paths in state x, and let
L+av(x) =
∑
P∈P
xP
n
ℓP (x+ 1P ) .
Finally, let ℓmax = maxxmaxP∈P ℓP (x) denote the maximum latency of any path. Throughout this paper,
whenever we consider a fixed state x we simply drop the argument (x) from Φ, ℓP , ℓ+P , Lav, and L+av.
2.2 The Elasticity and the Slope of Latency Functions
To bound the steepness of the latency functions and the effect that overshooting may have, we consider the
elasticity of the latency functions. Let d denote an upper bound on the elasticity of the latency functions, i. e.,
d ≥ max
e∈E
sup
x∈(0,n]
{
ℓ′e(x) · x
ℓe(x)
}
.
Now given a latency function with elasticity d, it holds that for any x and α ≥ 1, ℓe(αx) ≤ ℓe(x) · αd and
for 0 ≤ α < 1, ℓe(αx) ≥ ℓe(x) · αd. As an example, the function a xd has elasticity d.
For almost empty resources, we will also need an upper bound on the slope of the the latency functions.
Let νe denote the maximum slope on almost empty edges, i. e.,
νe = max
x∈{1,...,d}
{ℓe(x)− ℓe(x− 1)} .
Finally, for P ∈ P , let νP =
∑
e∈P νe and choose ν such that ν ≥ maxP∈P νP .
2.3 The Imitation Protocol
Our IMITATION PROTOCOL (Protocol 1) proceeds in two steps. First, a player samples another agent uni-
formly at random. The player then migrates with a certain probability from its old path P to the sampled
path Q depending on the anticipated relative latency gain (ℓP (x) − ℓQ(x + 1Q − 1P ))/ℓP (x) and on the
elasticity of the latency functions. Our analysis concentrates on dynamics that result from the protocol being
executed by the players in parallel in a round-based fashion. These dynamics generate a sequence of states
x(0), x(1), . . .. The resulting dynamics converge to a state that is stable in the sense that imitation cannot
produce further progress, i. e., x(t + 1) = x(t) with probability 1. Such a state is called an imitation-stable
state. In other words, a state is imitation-stable if it is ǫ-Nash with ǫ = ν with respect to the strategy space
restricted to the current support. Here, ǫ-Nash means that no agent can improve its own payoff unilaterally by
more than ǫ.
As discussed in the introduction, the main difficulty in the design of the protocol is to bound overshooting
effects. To get an intuition of this problem, consider two parallel links of which the first has the constant
latency function ℓ1(x) = c and the second has the latency function ℓ2(x) = xd. Recall that the elasticity
of ℓ2 is d. Furthermore, assume that only a small number of agents x2 utilizes link 2 whereas the majority
of n − x2 users utilizes link 1. Let b = c − xd2 > 0 denote the latency difference between the two links.
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Protocol 1 IMITATION PROTOCOL, repeatedly executed by all players in parallel.
Let P denote the path of the player in state x.
Sample another player uniformly at random. Let Q denote its path.
if ℓP (x) > ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P ) + ν then
with probability
µPQ =
λ
d
·
ℓP (x) − ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )
ℓP (x)
migrate from path P to path Q.
end if
A simple calculation shows that using the protocol without the damping factor 1/d, the expected latency
increase on link 2 would be Θ(b · d), overshooting the balanced state by a factor d. For this reason, we reduce
the migration probability accordingly. The constant λ will be determined later.
Note that the arguments in the last paragraph hold for the expected load changes. Our protocol, however,
has to take care of probabilistic effects, i. e., the realized migration vector may differ from its expectation.
Typically, we can use the elasticity to bound the impact of this effect. However, if the congestion on an edge
is very small, i. e., less than d, then the number of joining agents is not concentrated sharply enough around
its expectation. In order to compensate for this, we add an additional requirement that agents only migrate
if the anticipated latency gain is at least ν and use this to bound probabilistic effects if the congestion of the
edge is less than d. Let us remark that we will see below (Theorem 9) that for a large class of singleton games
it is very unlikely, that an edge will ever have a load of d or less, so the protocol will behave in the same way
with high probability for a polynomial number of rounds even if this additional requirement is dropped.
3 Imitation Dynamics in Games with General Strategy Spaces
In this chapter, we consider imitation dynamics that emerge if in each round players concurrently apply the
IMITATION PROTOCOL. At first, we observe that imitation dynamics converge to imitation stable states since
in each round the potential Φ(x) decreases in expectation. From this result we derive a pseudopolynomial
upper bound on the convergence time to imitation-stable states.
3.1 Pseudopolynomial Time Convergence to Imitation-Stable States
Consider two states x and x′ as well as a migration vector ∆x = (∆xP )P∈P such that x′ = x + ∆x. We
may imagine ∆x as the result of one round of the IMITATION PROTOCOL although the following lemma is
independent of how ∆x is constructed. Furthermore, we consider ∆x to be composed of a set of migrations
of agents between pairs of paths, i. e., ∆xPQ denotes the number of players who switch from path P to path
Q, and ∆xP denotes the total increase or decrease of the number of players utilizing path P , that is,
∆xP =
∑
Q∈P
(xQP − xPQ) .
Also, let ∆xe =
∑
P∋e∆xP denote the induced change of the number of players utilizing edge e ∈ E. In
order to prove convergence, we define the virtual potential gain
VPQ(x,∆x) = xPQ · (ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )− ℓP (x))
which is the sum of the potential gains each player migrating from path P to path Q would contribute to
∆Φ if each of them was the only migrating player. Note that if a player improves the latency of his path,
the potential gain is negative. The sum of all virtual potential gains is a very rough lower bound on the true
potential gain ∆Φ(x,∆x) = Φ(x+∆x)−Φ(x). In order to compensate for the fact that players concurrently
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change their strategies, consider the error term on an edge e ∈ E:
Fe(x,∆x) =


xe+∆xe∑
u=xe+1
ℓe(u)− ℓe(xe + 1) if ∆xe > 0
xe∑
u=xe+∆xe+1
ℓe(xe)− ℓe(u) if ∆xe < 0
0 if ∆xe = 0
Subsequently, we show that the sum of the virtual potential gains and the error terms is indeed an upper bound
on the true potential gain ∆Φ(x,∆x). A similar result is shown in [16] for a continuous model.
Lemma 1. For any assignment x and migration vector ∆x it holds that
∆Φ(x,∆x) ≤
∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ(x,∆x) +
∑
e∈E
Fe(x,∆x) .
Proof. We first express the virtual potential gain in terms of latencies on the edges. Clearly,∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ(x,∆x) =
∑
P,Q∈P
xPQ · (ℓQ(x + 1Q − 1P )− ℓP (x))
≤
∑
P,Q∈P
xPQ ·

∑
e∈Q
ℓe(xe + 1)−
∑
e∈P
ℓe(xe)


≤
∑
e:∆xe>0
∆xe · ℓe(xe + 1) +
∑
e:∆xe<0
∆xe · ℓe(xe) . (1)
The true potential gain, however, is
∆Φ(x,∆x) =
∑
e:∆xe>0
xe+∆xe∑
u=xe+1
ℓe(u)−
∑
e:∆xe<0
xe∑
u=xe−∆xe+1
ℓe(u)
=
∑
e:∆xe>0
(
∆xe · ℓe(xe + 1) +
xe+∆xe∑
u=xe+1
(ℓe(u)− ℓe(xe + 1))
)
+
∑
e:∆xe<0
(
∆xe · ℓe(xe) +
xe∑
u=xe−∆xe+1
(ℓe(xe)− ℓe(u))
)
.
Substituting Equation (1) for the left term of each sum and the definition of Fe for the right term of each sum,
we obtain the claim of the Lemma.
In the following, we consider ∆x to be a migration vector generated by the IMITATION PROTOCOL rather
than an arbitrary vector. In this case, ∆x is a random variable and all probabilities and expectations are taken
with respect to the IMITATION PROTOCOL. In order to prove that the potential decreases in expectation, we
derive a bound on the size of the error terms. We show that the error terms reduce the virtual potential gain by
at most a factor of two, or, put another way, that the true potential gain is at least half of the virtual potential
gain.
Lemma 2. Let x denote a state and let the random variable ∆x denote a migration vector generated by the
IMITATION PROTOCOL. Then,
E [∆Φ(x,∆x)] ≤
1
2
∑
P,Q∈P
E [VPQ(x,∆x)] .
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Proof. For any given round, each term in VPQ, P,Q ∈ P and Fe, e ∈ E can be associated with an agent.
Fix an agent i migrating from, say, P to Q. Its contribution to the VPQ(x,∆x) is ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )− ℓP (x)
(this is the same for all agents moving from P to Q). It also contributes to Fe, e ∈ P ∪ Q. The size of this
term depends on the ordering of the agents. We will consider the migrating agents in ascending order of the
migration probability µPjQj , where Pj and Qj denote the origin and destination path of agent j, respectively.
Ties are broken arbitrarily.
Fix an edge e ∈ E and let A+(e) and A−(e) denote the set of agents migrating to and away from e ∈ E,
respectively. Let A(e) = A+(e) ∪ A−(e). Let ∆x˜e denote the contribution to ∆xe of agents in A(e) which
occur in our ordering with respect to µPQ before agent i.
ℓe(x)
x
∆x˜exe
ℓe′(x)
x
Figure 1: Potential gain of an agent migrating from edge e′ towards edge e. The hatched area is the agent’s
virtual potential gain. The shaded area on the left is this agents contribution to the error term, caused by the
∆x˜e agents ranking before the agent under consideration (with respect to µPQ).
Agent i’s contribution to Fe(x,∆x) is ∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e) where we define the error function ∆ℓ˜e(δ) = ℓe(xe +
1 + δ)− ℓe(xe + 1). For an illustration, see Figure 1. Note that there is an exception: If e ∈ Q ∩ P , then the
contribution of agent i to Fe is zero and there is nothing to show. For brevity, let us write ℓe = ℓe(xe) and
ℓ+e = ℓe(xe + 1) as well as ℓP = ℓP (x) and ℓ+Q = ℓP (xe + 1Q − 1P ). For e ∈ Q \ P we show that
E
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
≤
1
8
· (ℓP − ℓ
+
Q) ·
(
ℓ+e
ℓ+Q
+
νe
νQ
)
, (2)
and for e ∈ P \Q,
E
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
≤
1
8
· (ℓP − ℓ
+
Q) ·
(
ℓe
ℓP
+
νe
νP
)
. (3)
Thus, the expected sum of the error terms of an agent migrating from P to Q is at most
ℓP − ℓ
+
Q
8

 ∑
e∈P\Q
(
ℓe
ℓP
+
νe
νP
)
+

 ∑
e∈Q\P
ℓ+e
ℓ+Q
+
νe
νQ



 ≤ 1
2
(ℓP − ℓ
+
Q) ,
i. e., half of its virtual potential gain, which proves the lemma. First, consider the case that e ∈ Q where Q
denotes the destination path of agent i.
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For brevity, let us write IPQ = (ℓP − ℓ+Q)/ℓP for the incentive to migrate from P to Q. Again, consider
the case that e ∈ Q where Q denotes the destination path of agent i. Then, due to our ordering of the agents,
E [∆x˜e] ≤ n ·
xe
n
· µPQ ≤
λ · xe · IPQ
d
, (4)
implying
xe ≥
E [∆x˜e] · d
λ · IPQ
. (5)
Furthermore, due to the elasticity of ℓe, and using (1 + 1/x)x ≤ exp(1), we obtain
∆ℓ˜e(δ) ≤ ℓ
+
e ·
(
xe + 1 + δ
xe + 1
)d
− ℓe
≤ ℓ+e ·
(
1 +
δ
xe
)d
− ℓ+e
≤ ℓ+e ·
(
e
d δ
xe − 1
)
. (6)
Subsequently, we consider two cases.
Case 1: E [∆x˜e] ≥ 164 . Substituting Inequality (5) into Inequality (6), we obtain for every κ ∈ R−≥ 0q
∆ℓ˜e (κE [∆x˜e]) ≤ ℓ
+
e ·
(
eκλ IPQ − 1
)
.
Now, note that for every k ∈ N and κ ∈ [k, k + 1]
P [∆x˜e ≥ κE [∆x˜e]] ≤ P [∆x˜e ≥ k E [∆x˜e]] and
∆ℓ˜e(κE [∆x˜e]) ≤ ∆ℓ˜e((k + 1)E [∆x˜e])
hold. Applying a Chernoff bound (Fact 16 in the appendix), we obtain an upper bound for the expecta-
tion of E
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
as follows.
E
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
≤
∞∑
k=1
P [∆x˜e ≥ kE [∆x˜e]] ·∆ℓ˜e((k + 1)E [∆x˜e])
≤ ∆ℓ˜+e (5E [∆x˜e]) +
∞∑
k=5
P [∆x˜e ≥ k E [∆x˜e]] ·∆ℓ˜e((k + 1)E [∆x˜e])
≤ ℓ+e ·
(
e5λ IPQ − 1
)
+
∞∑
k=5
e−
1
4 E[∆x˜e] k ln k · ℓ+e ·
(
e(k+1) λ IPQ − 1
)
≤ ℓ+e ·
(
e5λ IPQ − 1
)
+
∞∑
k=5
e−
1
4 E[∆x˜e] k · ℓ+e ·
(
e2 k λ IPQ − 1
)
≤ ℓ+e ·
(
e5λ IPQ − 1
)
+
∫ ∞
4
e−
1
4 E[∆x˜e]u · ℓ+e ·
(
e2 uλ IPQ − 1
)
du
= ℓ+e ·
(
e5λIPQ − 1 + e−E[∆x˜e]
e8 λ IPQ − 1 + 8λ IPQ
E[∆x˜e]
1
4E [∆x˜e]− 2λ IPQ
)
.
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Now, due to Fact 17 in the appendix (with r = 1) and our assumption that E [∆x˜e] ≥ 1/64, we obtain
E
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
≤ λ · ℓ+e · IPQ ·
(
5 (e− 1) +
8 (e− 1) + 8 · 64
1
4·64 − 2λ
)
≤ c · λ · ℓ+e ·
ℓP − ℓ
+
Q
ℓP
≤ c · λ · ℓ+e ·
ℓP − ℓ
+
Q
ℓ+Q
for some constant c. The first inequality holds if λ < 1/512, proving Equation (2) if λ is chosen small
enough.
Case 2: E [∆x˜e] < 164 . Again, in this case we can apply a Chernoff bound (Fact 16) to upper boundE
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
.
E
[
∆ℓ˜e (∆x˜e)
]
≤
n∑
k=1
P [∆x˜e = k] ·∆ℓ˜e(k)
≤
n∑
k=1
P
[
∆x˜e ≥
k
E [∆x˜e]
E [∆x˜e]
]
·∆ℓ˜e(k)
≤
n∑
k=1
e−k (ln(k/E[∆x˜e])−1) ·∆ℓ˜e(k)
There are two sub-cases:
Case 2a: xe > d. In order to bound the expected latency increase, we apply the elasticity bound on ℓe:
E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
≤
n∑
k=1
e−k (ln(k/E[∆x˜e])−1) · ℓ+e ·
(
e
k d
xe − 1
)
≤ ℓ+e ·
n∑
k=1
e−k (ln(k)−ln(E[∆x˜e])−1) ·
(
e
k d
xe − 1
)
≤ ℓ+e ·
n∑
k=1
(
E [∆x˜e] (e
k
E [∆x˜e]
k−1)
)
e−k (ln k) ·
(
e
k d
xe − 1
)
≤ ℓ+e · E [∆x˜e] ·
n∑
k=1
e−k (ln k) ·
(
e
k d
xe − 1
)
.
Now, splitting up the sum, we define
L1 = E [∆x˜e]
⌊ 8 xed ⌋∑
k=1
e−k (ln k) ·
(
e
k d
xe − 1
)
≤ E [∆x˜e]
(e8 − 1) d
8 xe
⌊ 8xed ⌋∑
k=1
e−k (ln k) · k
L1 ≤
e8
4
· E [∆x˜e]
d
xe
≤
e8
4
· ℓ+e · λ IPQ ,
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where the first inequality uses the observation that e
k d
xe ≤ e8 since k ≤ ⌊8xe/d⌋, and Fact 17 (with
r = 8). Additionally, where the third inequality uses the observation that∑∞k=1 e−k (lnk) · k ≤ 2,
and finally where the last inequality uses Inequality (4).
For the second part of the sum, let
L2 = E [∆x˜e]
∞∑
k=⌈ 8 xed ⌉
e−k (ln k) ·
(
e
k d
xe − 1
)
≤ E [∆x˜e]
∞∑
k=⌈ 8 xed ⌉
e−k (ln k)+
k d
xe
= E [∆x˜e]
∞∑
k=⌈ 8 xed ⌉
e−k (ln k−1) (since xe > d)
≤ E [∆x˜e]
∞∑
k=⌈ 8 xed ⌉
e−
1
2 k ln k (since k ≥ ⌈8xed ⌉ ≥ 8)
≤ E [∆x˜e]
∞∑
k=⌈ 8 xed ⌉
(
d
8 xe
) 1
2k
.
Due to Fact 18 and since xe > d
L2 = E [∆x˜e]
(
d
8xe
) 8
2
1−
√
d
8 xe
≤ E [∆x˜e]
d
xe
≤ λ IPQ .
Reassembling the sum, we obtain
E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
≤ ℓ+e · (L1 + L2)
≤ ℓ+e ·
(
e8
4
+ 1
)
λ IPQ .
Again, by the same arguments as at the end of Case 1 this proves Equation (2) if λ is less than
1/(2e8 + 8).
Case 2b: xe ≤ d. In this case we separate the upper bound on E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
into the section up to d
and above d. For the first section we use the fact that each additional player on resource e causes
a latency increase of at most νe as long as the load is at most d. We define the contribution to
the expected latency increase by the events that up to d − xe join resource e, i. e., afterwards the
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congestion is still at most d. In this case, we may use νe to bound the contribution of each agent:
L1 ≤
d−xe∑
k=1
e−k (ln(
k
E[∆x˜e]
)−1) · k νe
≤ e νe E [∆x˜e] + νe E [∆x˜e]
2
d−xe∑
k=2
e−k (ln(k)−1) · k
≤ e νe E [∆x˜e] ·
(
1 +
8E [∆x˜e]
e
)
≤ 3 νe E [∆x˜e] ,
where the third inequality holds since
∑d−xe
k=2 e
−k (ln(k)−1) · k ≤ 8, and where the last inequality
holds since E [∆x˜e] < 1/64.
For the contribution of the agents increasing the load on resource e to above d we use the elasticity
constraint again. This time, we do not consider the latency increase with respect to ℓ+e (xe) but
with respect to ℓe(d):
L2 =
n∑
k=d−xe+1
e−k·(ln(
k
E[∆x˜e]
)−1) · ℓe(d) ·
(
e
d (k−(d−xe))
d − 1
)
.
As in case (2a),
L2 ≤ ℓe(d) · E [∆x˜e] ·
∞∑
k=d−xe+1
e−k ln k+k−(d−xe)
= ℓe(d) · E [∆x˜e] ·
∞∑
k=1
e−(k+(d−xe)) ln(k+(d−xe))+k
= ℓe(d) · E [∆x˜e] · e
−(d−xe) ·
∞∑
k=1
e−(k+(d−xe)) ln(k+(d−xe))+k+d−xe .
Consider the series in the above expression as a function of u = (d− xe) and denote it by S(u).
Note that S(u) converges for every u ≥ 0 and S(u) → 0 as u→ ∞. In particular, S(u) < 8 for
any u ≥ 0, so
L2 ≤ 8 ℓe(d) · E [∆x˜e] · e
−(d−xe)
≤ 8 (ℓe(xe) + (d− xe) νe) · E [∆x˜e] · e
−(d−xe) .
Since (d− xe) · e−(d−xe) < 1/2,
L2 ≤ 4 (ℓe(xe) + νe) · E [∆x˜e] .
Altogether,
E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
≤ L1 + L2
≤ 7 νe E [∆x˜e] + 4 ℓe(xe)E [∆x˜e]
≤ 7 νe E [∆x˜e] + 4
λxe IPQ
d
· ℓe(xe)
≤
7
64
ν
νe
νQ
+
4λxe IPQ
d
· ℓe(xe)
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where we have used Equation (4) for the third inequality, and the inequalities E [∆x˜e] < 1/64
and ν ≥ νQ for the last step. Since xe ≤ d and ℓP − ℓ+Q ≥ ν,
E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
≤
1
8
(ℓP − ℓ
+
Q)
νe
νQ
+
4λ (ℓP − ℓ
+
Q)
ℓP
· ℓe(xe)
again proving Equation (2) if λ ≤ 1/32.
Finally, the case e ∈ P is very similar.
Note that all migrating players add a negative contribution to the virtual potential gain since they migrate
only from paths with currently higher latency to paths with lower latency. Hence, together with Lemma 2, we
can derive the next corollary.
Corollary 3. Consider a symmetric network congestion game Γ and let x and x′ denote states of Γ such that
x′ is a random state generated after one round of executing the IMITATION PROTOCOL. Then,
E [Φ(x′)] ≤ Φ(x)
with strict inequality as long as x is not imitation-stable. Thus, Φ is a super-martingale.
It is obvious that the sequence of states generated by the IMITATION PROTOCOL terminates at an imitation-
stable state. From Lemma 2 we can immediately derive an upper bound on the time to reach such a state.
However, since for arbitrary latency functions the minimum possible latency gain may be very small, this
bound can clearly be only pseudo-polynomial. To see this, consider a state in which only one player can
make an improvement. Then, the expected time until the player moves is inverse proportional to its latency
gain.
Theorem 4. Consider a symmetric network congestion game in which all players use the IMITATION PRO-
TOCOL. Let x denote the initial state of the dynamics. Then the dynamics converge to an imitation-stable
state in expected time
O
(
dn ℓmaxΦ(x)
ν2
)
.
Proof. By definition of the IMITATION PROTOCOL, the expected virtual potential gain in any state x′ which
is not yet imitation-stable is at least
E

 ∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ(x
′,∆x′)

 ≤ −ν · λ
dn
·
ν
ℓmax
.
Hence, also the expected potential gain E [∆Φ(x′)] in every intermediate state x′ of the dynamics is bounded
from above by at least half of the above value. From this, it follows, that the expected time until the potential
drops from at most Φ(x) to the minimum potential Φ∗ is at most
dn ℓmax(Φ(x) − Φ∗)
λ ν2
.
Formally, this is a consequence of Lemma 20 which can be found in the Appendix.
It is obvious that this result cannot be significantly improved since we can easily construct an instance
and a state such that the only possible improvement that can be made is ν. Hence, already a single step takes
pseudopolynomially long. In case of polynomial latency functions Theorem 4 reads as follows.
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Corollary 5. Consider a symmetric network congestion game with polynomial latency functions with maxi-
mum degree d and minimum and maximum coefficients amin and amax, respectively. Let k = maxP∈P |P |.
Then the dynamics converges to an imitation-stable state in expected time
O
(
d2 k2 n2d+2 ·
(
amax
amin
)2)
.
Let us remark that all proofs in this section do not rely on the assumption that the underlying congestion
game is symmetric. In fact, the lemma also holds for asymmetric congestion games in which each player
samples only among players that have the same strategy space.
3.2 Sequential Imitation Dynamics and a Lower Bound
In the previous section, we proved that players applying the IMITATION PROTOCOL reach an imitation-stable
state after a pseudopolynomial number of rounds. Recall that in this case each player decreases its latency
by at least ν if it were the only player to change its strategy. In this section, we consider sequential imitation
dynamics such that in each round a single player is permitted to imitate someone else. Furthermore, we
assume that each player changes its path regardless of the anticipated latency gain. Now, it is obvious that
sequential imitation dynamics converge towards imitation-stable states as the potential Φ strictly decreases
after every strategy change. Hence, we focus on the convergence time of such dynamics.
For such sequential imitation dynamics we prove an exponential lower bound on the number of rounds to
reach an imitation-stable state. To be precise, we present a family of symmetric network congestion games
with corresponding initial states such that every sequence of imitation leading to an imitation-stable state is
exponentially long. To some extent, this results complements Theorem 4 as it presents an exponential lower
bound in a slightly different model. However, in this lower bound ν is arbitrary large and almost every state
is imitation-state with respect to the IMITATION PROTOCOL.
Theorem 6. For every n ∈ N, there exists a symmetric network congestion game with n players, initial
state S init, polynomial bounded network size, and linear latency functions such that every sequential imitation
dynamics that start in S init is exponentially long.
Subsequently, we do not give a complete proof of the theorem but we discuss how to adapt a series
of constructions as presented in [1] which shows that there exists a family of symmetric network congestion
games with the same properties as stated in the above theorem such that every best response dynamics starting
in S init is exponentially long. To be precise, they prove that in every intermediate state of the best response
dynamics exactly one player can improve its latency. Recall that in best response dynamics players know the
entire strategy space and that in each round one player is permitted the switch to the best available path.
In the following, we summarize the constructions presented in [1]. At first, a PLS-reduction from the
local search variant of MaxCut to threshold games is presented. In a threshold game, each player either
allocates a single resource on its own or shares a bunch of resources with other players. Hence, in a threshold
game each player chooses between two strategies only. The precise definition of these games is given below.
Then, a PLS-reduction from threshold games to asymmetric network congestion games is presented. Finally,
the authors of [1] show how to transform an asymmetric network congestion game into a symmetric one
such that the desired properties of best response dynamics are preserved. All PLS-reductions are embedding,
and there exists a family of instances of MaxCut with corresponding initial configurations such that in every
intermediate configuration generated by a local search algorithm exactly one node can be moved to the other
side of the cut. Therefore, there exists a family of symmetric network congestion games with the properties
as stated above.
A naive approach to prove a lower bound on the convergence time of imitation dynamics in symmetric
network congestion games is as follows. Building upon the lower bound of the convergence time of best
responses dynamics, a player for every path is added to the game. Then the latency functions are adopted
accordingly. However, in this case we would introduce an exponential number of additional players. In
threshold games, however, the players’ strategy spaces have size two only. Hence, we could apply this
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approach to threshold games. In the following, we present the details of this approach. It is then not difficult
to verify that the PLS-reductions mentioned above can be reworked in order to prove Theorem 6. However,
note that this does not imply that computing a imitation-stable state is PLS-complete since one can always
assign all players to the same strategy which obviously is an imitation-stable state.
Threshold games are a special class of congestion games in which the set of resources R can be divided
into two disjoint sets Rin and Rout. The set Rout contains exactly one resource ri for every player i ∈ N .
This resource has a fixed latency Ti called the threshold of player i. Each player i has only two strategies,
namely a strategy Souti = {ri} with ri ∈ Rout, and a strategy S ini ⊆ Rin. The preferences of player i can be
described in a simple and intuitive way: Player i prefers strategy S ini to strategy Souti if the latency of S ini is
smaller than the threshold Ti. Quadratic threshold games are a subclass of threshold games in which the set
Rin contains exactly one resource rij for every unordered pair of players {i, j} ⊆ N . Additionally, for every
player i ∈ N of a quadratic threshold game, S ini = {rij | j ∈ N , j 6= i}. Moreover, for every resource
rij ∈ Rin: ℓrij (x) = ai,j · x with aij ∈ N, and for every resource ri: ℓri(x) = 1/2
∑
j 6=i aij · x to ri.
Let Γ be a quadratic treshold game that has an initial state S init, such that every best response dynamics
which starts S init is exponentially long, and every intermediate state has a unique player which can improve
its latency. Suppose now that we replace every player i in Γ by three players i1, i2 and i3 which all have the
same strategy spaces as player i has. Additionally, suppose that we choose new latency functions ℓ′ for every
resource ri as follows: ℓ′ri(x) = 1/2
∑
j 6=i aij · x + 3/2
∑
j 6=i aij . Hence, we add an additional offset of
3/2
∑
j 6=i aij .
Suppose now that we assign every player i1 to Souti , and every player i2 to S ini . For every possible strategy
that the i3 players can use, their latency increases by 2
∑
j 6=i aij , compared to the equivalent state in the
original game, in which every player i chooses the same strategy as player i3 does. Hence, if if we assign
every player i3 to the strategy chosen by player i in S init and if the players i1 and i2 were not permitted to
change their strategies, then we would obtain the desired lower bound on the convergence time of imitation
dynamics in threshold games. However, since also i1 and i2 are permitted to imitate, it remains to show
that whenever player i3 has changed its strategy, then both i1 and i2 do not want to change their strategies
anymore.
First, suppose that player i3 switches from the strategy of player i2 to the strategy of player i1. Obviously,
player i1 does not want to change its strategy as otherwise i3 would not have imitated i1. Suppose now that
i2, whose strategy is dropped by i3, also wants to imitate i1. In this case all three players would allocate Souti ,
and hence have latency 3
∑
r∈j 6=i aij . However, if player i2 would stay with strategy S in then its latency is
upper bounded by 2
∑
r∈Sini
aij . Hence, players i1, i2, i3 will never select Sout at the same time.
Second, suppose that player i3 switches from the strategy of player i1 to the strategy of player i2. Now,
player i2 does not want to change its strategy as otherwise i3 would not have imitated i2. Suppose now that
i1, whose strategy is dropped by i3, also wants to imitate i3. In this case, the latency would increase to at least
3
∑
r∈j 6=i aij , whereas player i1 would have latency 2
∑
r∈j 6=i aij if it would stay with strategy Sout. Hence,
players i1, i2, i3 will never select S in at the same time.
By applying the argument that all three players never allocate the same strategy at the same point in time
we can conclude our claim and Theorem 6 follows.
4 Fast Convergence to Approximate Equilibria
Theorem 4 guarantees convergence of concurrent imitation dynamics generated by the IMITATION PROTO-
COL to an imitation-stable state in the long run. However, it does not give a reasonable bound on the time due
to the small progress that can be made. Hence, as our main result, we present bounds on the time to reach an
approximate equilibrium. Here we relax the definition of an imitation-stable state in two aspects: We allow
only a small minority of agents to deviate by more than a small amount from the average latency. Our notion
of an approximate equilibrium is similar to the notion used in [6, 15, 17]. It is motivated by the following
observation. When sampling other players each player gets to know its latency if it would adopt that players’
strategy. Hence to some extend each player can compute the average latency L+av and determine if its own
latency is above or below that average.
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Definition 1 ((δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium). Given a state x, let the set of expensive paths be P+ǫ,ν = {P ∈ P :
ℓP (x) > (1 + ǫ)L
+
av + ν} and let the set of cheap paths be P−ǫ,ν = {P ∈ P : ℓP (x) < (1− ǫ)Lav − ν}. Let
Pǫ,ν = P+ǫ,ν ∪ P
−
ǫ,ν . A configuration x is at a (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium iff it holds that
∑
P∈Pǫ,ν xP ≤ δ · n.
Intuitively, a state at (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium is a state in which almost all agents are almost satisfied when
comparing their own situation with the situation of other agents. One may hope that it is possible to reach
a state in which all agents are almost satisfied quickly . This would be a relaxation of the concept of Nash
equilibrium. We will argue below, however, that there is no rapid convergence to such states.
Theorem 7. For an arbitrary initial assignment x0, let τ denote the first round in which the IMITATION
PROTOCOL reaches a (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium. Then,
E [τ ] = O
(
d
ǫ2 δ
· log
(
Φ(x0)
Φ∗
))
.
Proof. We consider a state x(t) that is not at a (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium and derive a lower bound on the expected
potential gain. There are two cases. Either at least half of the agents utilizing paths in Pǫ,ν utilize paths in
P+ǫ,ν or at least half of them utilize paths in P−ǫ,ν .
Case 1: Many agents use expensive paths, i. e.,
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP ≥ δ n/2. Let us define the volume T and
the average ex-post latency C of potential destination paths, i. e., paths with ex-post latency at most
(1 + ǫ)L+av, by
T =
∑
Q:ℓ+
Q
≤(1+ǫ)L+av
xQ
n
and C = 1
T
∑
Q:ℓ+
Q
≤(1+ǫ)L+av
xQ
n
ℓ+Q .
Clearly,
L+av =
∑
P
xP
n
ℓ+P ≥ T · C + (1− T ) · (1 + ǫ)L
+
av ,
and solving for T yields
T ≥
ǫ L+av
(1 + ǫ)L+av − C
. (7)
We now give a lower bound on the expected virtual potential gain given that the current state is not at
a (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium. We consider only the contribution of agents utilizing paths in P+ǫ,ν and sampling
paths with ex-post latency below (1 + ǫ)L+av. Then,
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP
∑
Q:ℓ+≤(1+ǫ)L+av
xQ
n
·
ℓP − ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )
ℓP
(ℓP − ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P ))
= −
λ
d
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP ℓP
∑
Q:ℓ+≤(1+ǫ)L+av
xQ
n
·
(
ℓP − ℓ
+
Q
ℓP
)2
.
Using Jensen’s inequality (Fact 19) and substituting ℓP ≥ L+av yields
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
L+av
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP

 ∑
Q:ℓ+≤(1+ǫ)L+av
xQ
n
·
ℓP − ℓ
+
Q
ℓP


2
·
1∑
Q:ℓ+
Q
≤(1+ǫ)L+av
xQ
n
.
Now we substitute ℓP ≥ (1 + ǫ)L+av and use the fact that the squared expression is monotone in ℓP .
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Furthermore, we substitute the definition of T and C to obtain
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
L+av
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP

T (1 + ǫ)L+av −∑Q:ℓ+≤(1+ǫ)L+av xQ ℓ
+
Q
n
(1 + ǫ)L+av


2
·
1
T
≤ −
λ
d
L+av
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP
(
T (1 + ǫ)L+av − T C
(1 + ǫ)L+av
)2
·
1
T
= −
λ
d
L+av ·
(
(1 + ǫ)L+av − C
(1 + ǫ)L+av
)2
· T ·
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP .
We can now use the tradeoff shown in Equation (7), C ≤ L+av, and
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP > δ n/2 to obtain
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
· L+av ·
(1 + ǫ)L+av − C
((1 + ǫ)L+av)2
· ǫ L+av ·
∑
P∈P+ǫ,ν
xP
≤ −
λ
d
· ǫ ·
ǫ L+av
(1 + ǫ)2
·
δ n
2
≤ −Ω
(
ǫ2 · δ
d
· nL+av
)
.
Since nL+av ≥ Φ, we have by Lemma 2
E [Φ(x(t + 1))] ≤ Φ(x(t)) −
1
2
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ Φ(x(t))(1− Ω(ǫ2 · δ
d
))
.
Case 2: Many agents use cheap paths, i. e.,
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP ≥ δ n/2. This time, we define the volume T and
average latency C of paths which are potential origins of agents migrating towards P−ǫ,ν .
T =
∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ
n
and C = 1
T
∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ
n
ℓQ .
This time,
Lav ≤ T · C + (1 − T ) · (1− ǫ)Lav
implying
T ≥
ǫ Lav
C − (1− ǫ)Lav
. (8)
Similarly as in Case 1 we now give a lower bound on the contribution to the virtual potential gain
caused by agents with latency at least (1− ǫ)Lav sampling agents in P−ǫ,ν .
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ ℓQ
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP
n
·
(
ℓQ − ℓ
+
P
ℓQ
)2
.
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we rearrange the sum, apply Jensen’s inequality (Fact 19) to obtain
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP
∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ ℓQ
n
·
(
ℓQ − ℓ
+
P
ℓQ
)2
≤ −
λ
d
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP

 ∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ ℓQ
n
·
ℓQ − ℓ
+
P
ℓQ


2
·
1∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ ℓQ
n
= −
λ
d
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP

 ∑
Q:ℓQ≥(1−ǫ)Lav
xQ
n
· (ℓQ − ℓ
+
P )


2
·
1
C T
= −
λ
d
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP
(
T · (C − ℓ+P )
)2
·
1
C T
≤ −
λ
d
(T · (C − (1 − ǫ)Lav))
2 ·
1
C T
·
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP .
Finally, using Equation (8) and C T ≤ Lav,
E

∑
P,Q
VPQ

 ≤ −λ
d
(ǫ Lav)
2 ·
1
C T
·
∑
P∈P−ǫ,ν
xP
≤ −
λ ǫ2 Lav
d
δn
≤ −Ω
(
δ ǫ2Φ
d
)
.
In both cases, the potential decreases by at least a factor of (1 − Ω(ǫ2 δ/d)) in expectation, which, by
Lemma 20, implies that the expected time to reach a state with Φ(x(t)) ≤ Φ∗ is at most the time stated
in the theorem.
From Theorem 7 we can immediately derive the next corollary.
Corollary 8. Consider a symmetric network congestion game with polynomial latency functions of maximum
degree d and with minimum and maximum coefficients amax and amin, respectively. If all players use the
IMITATION PROTOCOL, then the expected convergence time of imitation dynamics to an (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium
is upper bounded by
O
(
d2
ǫ2 δ
· log
(
nm
amax
amin
))
.
Let us remark, that (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibria are transient, i. e., they can be left again once they are reached,
for example, if the average latency decreases or if agents migrate towards low-latency paths. However, our
proofs actually do not only bound the time until a (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium is reached for the first time, but rather
the expected total number of rounds in which the system is not at a (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibrium.
Note that in the definition of (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibria we require the majority of agents to deviate by no more
than a small amount from L+av. This is because the expected latency of a path sampled by an agent is Lav, but
the latency of the destination path becomes larger if the agent migrates. We use L+av as an upper bound in our
proof, although we could use a slightly smaller quantity in cases where the origin Q and the destination P
intersect, namely ℓP (x + 1P − 1Q). Using an average over P and Q of this quantity rather than L+av would
result in a slightly stronger definition of (δ,ǫ,ν)-equilibria. However, we go with the definition as presented
above for the sake of clarity of presentation.
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Let us conclude this section by showing that there are fundamental limitations to fast convergence. One
could hope to show fast convergence towards a state in which all agents are approximately satisfied, i. e.,
δ = 0. However, any protocol that proceeds by sampling either a strategy or an agent and then possibly
migrates, takes at least expected time Ω(n) to reach a state in which all agents sustain a latency that is within
a constant factor of L+av. To see this, consider an instance with n = 2m agents and identical linear latency
functions. Now, let x1 = 3, x2 = 1 and xi = 2 for 3 ≤ i ≤ n. Then, the probability that one of the players
currently using resource 1 samples resource 2 is at most O (1/m) = O (1/n). Since this is the only possible
improvement step, this yields the desired bound.
5 Imitation Dynamics in Singleton Games
In this section, we improve on our previous results and consider imitation dynamics in the special case of
singleton congestion games. A major drawback of the IMITATION PROTOCOL is that players who rely on
this protocol cannot explore the complete set of edge if the dynamics start in a state in which some edges are
unused. Even worse, the event that an edge becomes unused in later states, although it has been used in the
initial state, is not impossible. It is clear, however, that when starting from a random initial distribution of
players among the edges, the probability of emptying an edge becomes increasingly unlikely as the number
of players increases.
Subsequently, we formalize this statement in the following sense. Consider a family of singleton con-
gestion games over the same set of edges with latency functions without offsets. Then, the probability that
an edge becomes unused is exponentially small in the number of players. To this end, consider a vector of
continuous latency functions L = (ℓe)i∈[m] with ℓe : [0, 1]→ R≥0. To use these functions for games with a
finite number of players, we have to normalize them appropriately. For any such function ℓ ∈ L, let ℓn with
ℓn(x) = ℓ(x/n) denotes the respective scaled function. We may think of this as having n agents with weight
1/n each. Note that this transformation leaves the elasticity unchanged, whereas the step size ν decreases as
n increases. For a vector of latency functions L = (ℓe)i∈[m], let Ln = (ℓne )i∈[m].
Theorem 9. Fix a vector of latency functions L with ℓe(0) = 0 for all i ∈ [m]. For the singleton congestion
game over Ln with n players, the probability that the IMITATION PROTOCOL with random initialization
generates a state with xe = 0 for some i ∈ [m] within poly(n) rounds is bounded by 2−Ω(n).
Proof. Let d denote an upper bound on the elasticity of the functions in L, and let optL = miny{Lav(y)}
where the minimum is taken over all y ∈ {y′ ∈ Rm≥0 |
∑
e y
′
e = 1}. In other words, optL corresponds
to the minimum average latency achievable in a fractional solution. For any e ∈ [m], by continuity and
monotonicity, there exists an ye > 0 such that ℓe(ye) < optL /4d and ye < 1/m.
Consider the congestion game with n players and fix an arbitrary edge e ∈ [m]. In the following, we
upper bound the probability that the congestion on edge e falls below n ye/2. First, consider the random
initialization in which each resource receives an expected number of n/m agents. The probability that xe <
nye/2 ≤ n/(2m) is at most 2−Ω(nye). Now, consider any assignment x with xj > nyj/2 for all e ∈ [m].
There are two cases.
Case 1: xe > ye n. Since in expectation, our policy removes at most a λ/d fraction of the agents from edge
e, the expected load in the subsequent round is at least (1 − λ/d)xe. Since for sufficiently small λ it
holds that 1 − λ/d ≥ 3/4, we can apply a Chernoff bound (Fact 16) in order to obtain an upper bound
of 2−Ω(xe) for the probability that the congestion on e decreases to below xe/2 ≥ ye n/2.
Case 2: ye n/2 < xe ≤ ye n. Hence, ℓne (xe) ≤ optL /4d. In the following, let n− denote the number of
agents on edges r with ℓnr (xr + 1) < ℓne (xe), and let n+ denote the number of players utilizing edges
with latency above optL. There are two subcases:
Case 2a: n− = 0. Then, the probability that an agent leaves edge e is 0.
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Case 2b: n− ≥ 1. We first show that n+ ≥ 4 max{n−, xe}. For the sake of contradiction, assume
that n+ < 4n−. Now, consider an assignment where all of these players are shifted to edges
r with latency ℓnr (xr) < ℓne (xe) ≤ optL /4d, where edge r receives n+ · xr/n− (fractional)
players. In this assignment, the congestion on all edges is increased by no more than a factor of
n+/n− < 4. Hence, due to the limited elasticity, this increases the latency by strictly less than
a factor of 4d. Then, all edges have a latency of less than optL /4 · 4 = optL and some have
latency strictly less than optL, a contradiction. The same argument also holds if we consider only
resource e rather than all resources r considered above. Hence, also n+ ≥ 4 xe.
Now, consider the number of players leaving edge e. Clearly,
E
[
∆X−e
]
≤ xe ·
λ
d
∑
r:ℓnr (xr+1)<ℓ
n
e (xe)
xr
n
= xe ·
λn−
dn
.
All players with current latency at least optL can migrate to resource e since the anticipated
latency gain is larger than ν. Hence, the number of players migrating towards e, is at least
E
[
∆X+e
]
≥
∑
r:ℓnr (xr)≥optL
xr ·
λxe · (ℓnr (xr)− ℓ
n
e (xe + 1))
n d ℓnr (xr)
≥
λxe
n d
·
∑
r:ℓnr (xr)≥optL
xr ·
ℓnr (xr)− 2
d · ℓne (xe)
ℓnr (xr)
≥
λxe
n d
· (1 −
1
2d
) · n+
≥ 2 · xe ·
λ
dn
max{n−, xe} .
The third inequality holds since ℓnr ≥ optL and ℓne ≤ optL /4d and the last inequality holds since
d ≥ 1. For any T ≥ 0 it holds that
P [∆Xe ≥ 0] ≥ P
[
(∆X+e ≥ T ) ∧ (∆X
−
e ≤ T )
]
≥
(
1− P
[
∆X+e < T
])
·
(
1− P
[
∆X−e > T
])
.
Due to our lower bounds on E [∆X+e ] and E [∆X−e ] we can apply a Chernoff bound (Fact 16)
on these probabilities. We set T = 1.5λ max{xe, n−} xe/(dn) which is an upper bound on
E [∆X−e ] and a lower bound on E [∆X+e ], so
P
[
∆X+e < T
]
≤ 2−Ω(T ) ≤ 2−Ω(λ x
2
e/(d n)) and
P
[
∆X−e > T
]
≤ 2−Ω(T ) ≤ 2−Ω(λ x
2
e/(d n)) .
Altogether,
P [∆Xe ≥ 0] ≥
(
1− 2
−Ω
„
λx2e
d n
«)
·
(
1− 2
−Ω
„
λx2e
d n
«)
= 1− 2
−Ω
„
λx2e
d n
«
.
Finally, since xe ≥ n ye/2, P [∆Xe < 0] ≤ 2−Ω(λny
2
e/d) = 2−Ω(xe).
In all cases, the probability that the edge becomes unused is bounded by 2−Ω(xe) = 2−Ω(n). Hence, the same
holds also for m = poly(n) edges and poly(n) rounds.
The proof does not only show that edges do not become empty with high probability, but also that the
congestion does not fall below any constant congestion value. In particular, for the constant d this implies
that with high probability the dynamics never reach case 2b of the proof of Lemma 2. This is the only place
where our analysis relies on the parameter ν. Hence, for a large number of players we can remove it from the
protocol and the dynamics converge to an exact Nash equilibrium.
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5.1 The Price of Imitation
In the preceding section we have seen that it is unlikely that resources become unused when the granularity
of an agent decreases. If the instance, i. e., the latency functions and the number of users, is fixed, it is an
interesting question, how much the performance can suffer from the fact that the IMITATION PROTOCOL is
not innovative. We measure this degradation of performance by introducing the Price of Imitation which
is defined as the ratio between the expected social cost of the state to which the IMITATION PROTOCOL
converges, denoted IΓ, and the optimum social cost. The expectation is taken over the random choices of the
IMITATION PROTOCOL, including random initialization.
We answer this question here for the case of linear latency functions of the form ℓe(x) = ae x. Then,
d = 1 is an upper bound on the elasticity and ν = amax = maxe∈E{ae}. Choosing the average latency
SC(x) =
∑
e∈E(xe/n) · ℓe(xe) as the social cost measure, we show that the Price of Imitation is bounded by
a constant. It is, however, obvious that the same also holds if we consider the makespan, i. e., the maximum
latency, as social cost function.
The performance of the dynamics can be artificially degraded by introducing an extremely slow edge.
Thus, amax can be chosen extremely large such that any state is imitation-stable. However, such a resource
can be removed from the instance without harming the optimal solution at all since it would not be used
anyhow. We will call such resources useless and make this notion precise below.
Let us first define some quantities used in the proof. For a set of resources M , let AM =
∑
e∈M
1
ae
and
let AΓ = A[m]. For M ⊆ [m] let Γ \M denote the instance obtained from Γ by removing all resources in
M . In the proof, we do not compare the outcome of the IMITATION PROTOCOL to the optimum solution, but
rather to a lower bound, namely the optimal fractional solution. The optimal fractional solution x˜e can be
computed as x˜e = n/(AΓ ae). For this solution, the latency of all resources is ae · x˜e = n/AΓ. A resource
is useless if x˜e < 1. In the following, we assume that there are no useless resources. Then, we can show that
the social cost at an imitation-stable state in which all resources are used, does not differ by more than a small
constant from the optimal social cost (Lemma 11) and that the Price of Imitation is small. In fact, whereas
x˜e ≥ 1 is required for Lemma 11, we here need a slightly stronger assumption, namely that xe = Ω(logn).
Theorem 10. Assume that for the optimal fractional solution, x˜e = Ω(logn) large enough. The price of
imitation is at most (3 + o(1)). In particular, for δ > 0, and any n ≥ n0(δ) for a large enough value n0(δ)
(which is independent of the instance),
IΓ ≤ (3 + δ) ·
n
AΓ
.
We start by proving two lemmas.
Lemma 11. Let x be a state in which no agent can gain more than amax. Then,
n
AΓ
≤ SC(x) ≤ 3
n
AΓ
.
Proof. The lower bound has been proven above since n/AΓ is the social cost of an optimal fractional solution.
Also note that, since there are no useless resources, x˜e ≥ 1 and hence n/AΓ ≥ amax.
For the upper bound, consider a state x in which no agent can gain more than amax. For the sake of
contradiction assume that there exists a resource e ∈ [m] with ℓe(xe) > 3n/AΓ. Since x 6= x˜ there exists a
resource f 6= e with xf < x˜f . In particular, ℓf (xf + 1) < n/AΓ + amax ≤ 2n/AΓ ≤ ℓe(xe) − amax. The
last inequality holds due to our assumption on ℓe(xe) and since n/AΓ ≥ amax. Hence, any agent on resource
e can improve by amax by migrating to f , a contradiction.
Lemma 12. The IMITATION PROTOCOL converges towards an imitation-stable state in time O
(
n4 logn
)
.
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Proof. Consider a state x(t) in which there is at least one agent who can make an improvement of amax.
Since its current latency is at most n · amax and the probability to sample the correct resource is at least 1/n,
the probability to do so is at least λ · (1/n) · (amax/(n amax)) = λ/n2 and the virtual potential gain of such a
step is amax ≥ Φ/n2. Hence, the expected virtual potential gain in state x(t) is at least λΦ(x(t))/n4. Hence,
by Lemma 2,
E [Φ(x(t+ 1))] ≤ Φ(x(t)) ·
(
1−
λ
2n4
)
.
Note that Φ∗ ≥ n amin and amax ≤ n amin by the assumption that no resource is useless. Also, Φ(x(0)) ≤
n2 amax. Now, the theorem is an application of Lemma 21 in the appendix.
Based upon the proof of Theorem 9 we can now bound the probability that a resource becomes empty for
the case of linear latency functions more specifically.
Lemma 13. The probability that all resources of the subset M ⊆ [m] become empty in one round simultane-
ously is bounded from above by ∏
e∈M
2
−Ω
“
n
AΓ ae
”
.
Proof. Recall the bounds on the probability that a resource e ∈ [m] becomes empty in the proof of Theorem 9.
Since we now consider linear latency functions, we may explicitly compute the value of ye = 1/(AΓ ae).
Recall the two cases and the failure probability in the initialization:
Initialization: Here, the error probability was at most 2−Ω(nye) = 2−Ω
“
n
AΓ ae
”
.
Case 1: xe > ye n. Here, the error probability was at most 2−Ω(xe) = 2
−Ω
“
n
AΓ ae
”
.
Case 2: ye n/2 < xe ≤ ye n. Here, the error probability was at most 2−Ω(x
2
e/n) = 2
−Ω
“
n
(AΓ ae)
2
”
.
In all cases, the probability that resource i becomes empty is at most 2−Ω
“
n
AΓ ae
”
.
Furthermore, consider resources e and e′ and let E and E′ denote the events that e and e′ become empty,
respectively. It holds that, P [E′ | E] ≤ P [E′]. Therefore, P [E ∩ E′] = P [E] · P [E′ | E] ≤ P [E] · P [E′].
Extending this argument to several resources yields the statement of the lemma.
Using the above two lemmas, we can now prove the main theorem of this section.
Proof of Theorem 10. The proof is by induction on the number of resources m. Clearly, the statement holds
for m = 1, in which case there is only one assignment. In the following we divide the sequence of state
generated by the IMITATION PROTOCOL into phases consisting of several rounds. The phase is terminated
by one of the following events, whatever happens first:
1. A subset of resources M becomes empty.
2. The IMITATION PROTOCOL reaches an imitation-stable state.
3. The protocol enters round Θ(n5 logn).
If a phase ends because Event 1 occurs, we start a new phase for the instance Γ \M . If it ends because of
Event 3, we start a new phase for the original instance.
The probability for Event 1 is bounded by Lemma 13. Note that the probability is also bounded for up
to poly(n) many rounds. If a phase ends with Event 2 we have IΓ ≤ 3 nAΓ (Lemma 11). We bound the
probability of this event by 1, which is trivially true. Event 3 happens with a probability at most O (1/n).
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This can be shown using Lemma 12 and Markov’s inequality. Note that the expected social cost is still at
most IΓ. Summing up over all three events, we obtain the following recurrence:
IΓ ≤
∑
M⊂[m]
∏
e∈M
2
−Ω
“
n
AΓ ae
”
· IΓ\M + 3 ·
n
AΓ
+O
(
1
n
)
· IΓ
implying
IΓ ·
(
1−O
(
1
n
))
≤ 3 ·
n
AΓ
+
∑
M⊂[m]
∏
e∈M
2
−Ω
“
n
AΓ ae
”
· IΓ\M .
Substituting the induction hypothesis for IΓ\M , and introducing a constant c for the constant in the Ω(),
IΓ ·
(
1−O
(
1
n
))
≤ 3 ·
n
AΓ
+
∑
M⊂[m]
∏
e∈M
2
− c n
AΓ ae · 4
n
AΓ\M
= 3 ·
n
AΓ
+ 4
n
AΓ
∑
M⊂[m]
2
−
c nAM
AΓ ·
AΓ
AΓ\M
.
Now, by our assumption that for all e ∈ M , x˜e = n/(AΓ · ae) ≥ Ω(logn), we know that for all e, 1/ae ≥
c′ AΓ · logn/n for a constant c′ which we may choose appropriately. In particular, AM ≥ |M |c′AΓ · logn/n
and AΓ\M ≥ c′AΓ · logn/n. Altogether,
IΓ ·
(
1−O
(
1
n
))
≤
n
AΓ

3 + 4 ∑
M⊂[m]
2−c c
′ |M| log n ·
n
c′ logn


=
n
AΓ
(
3 + 4
m−1∑
k=1
(
m
k
)
2−c c
′ k log n ·
n
c′ logn
)
≤
n
AΓ
(
3 + 4
m−1∑
k=1
nk · 2−c c
′ k logn ·
n
c′ logn
)
≤
n
AΓ
(
3 + 4
m−1∑
k=1
2−(c c
′−1) k logn ·
n
c′ logn
)
≤
n
AΓ
(
3 + 4
m−1∑
k=1
n−(c c
′−1) k+1
c′ logn
)
≤ (3 + o(1))
n
AΓ
,
since the last sum is bounded by o(n). This implies our claim.
6 Exploring New Strategies
In Section 3, we have seen that, in the long run, the dynamics resulting from the IMITATION PROTOCOL
converges to an imitation-stable state in pseudopolynomial time. The IMITATION PROTOCOL and the concept
of an imitation-stable state have the drawback that the dynamics can stabilize in a quite disadvantageous
situation, e.g. when all players play the same expensive strategy. This is due to the fact that the strategy space
is essentially restricted to the current strategy choices of the agents. Strategies that might be attractive and
offer a large latency gain are “lost” once no player uses them anymore.
A stronger result would be convergence towards a Nash equilibrium. In the literature, several other pro-
tocols are discussed. For all of the protocols we are aware of, the probability to migrate from one strategy to
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another depends in some continuous, non-decreasing fashion on the anticipated latency gain, and it becomes
zero for zero gain. Hence, in a setting with arbitrary latency functions which we consider here, there always
exist simple instances and states that are not at equilibrium and in which only one improvement step is possi-
ble which has an arbitrarily small latency gain. Hence, it takes pseudopolynomially long, until an exact Nash
equilibrium is reached. Still, it might be desirable to design a protocol which reaches a Nash equilibrium in
the long run. There are several ways to achieve this goal. We will discuss three of them here.
Theorem 9 states the following for a particular class of singleton congestion games. With an increasing
number of players it becomes increasingly unlikely that useful strategies are lost. This allows to omit the
parameter ν from the protocol. If no strategies are lost for a long period of time, the dynamics will converge
towards an exact Nash equilibrium.
Second, we may add an additional “virtual agent” to every strategy, such that the probability to sample a
strategy never becomes zero. This has two implications on our analysis. On the one hand, there is a certain
base load on all resources, denoted by x0e . We then need to have an upper bound on the elasticity of ℓe(x−x0e)
which may be larger than the elasticity of ℓe(x) itself. Furthermore, we have to add |P| virtual agents, which
leaves the analysis of the time of convergence unchanged only if n = Ω(|P|).
As a third alternative, we can add an exploration component to the protocol. With a probability of 1/2, the
agents can sample another path uniformly at random rather than another agent. In this case, however, the elas-
ticity d cannot be used as a damping factor anymore, since the expected increase of congestion may be much
larger than the current load. Rather, we have to reduce the migration probability by a factor min
{
1, |P| ℓminβ n
}
where β is an upper bound on the maximum slope and ℓmin = mine∈E ℓe(1) is the minimum latency of an
empty resource.
Protocol 2 EXPLORATION PROTOCOL, repeatedly executed by all players in parallel.
Let P denote the path of the player in state x.
Sample another path Q ∈ P uniformly at random.
if ℓP (x) > ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P ) then
with probability
µPQ = min
{
1, λ ·
|P| ℓmin
β n
·
ℓP (x) − ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )
ℓP (x)
}
migrate from path P to bin Q.
end if
Lemma 14. Let x denote a state and let ∆x denote a random migration vector generated by the EXPLO-
RATION PROTOCOL. Then,
E [∆Φ(x,∆x)] ≤
1
2
∑
P,Q∈P
E [VPQ(x,∆x)] .
Proof. Recall that Lemma 1 states the following for every state x and every migration vector ∆x
∆Φ(x,∆x) ≤
∑
P,Q∈P
VPQ(x,∆x) +
∑
e∈E
Fe(x,∆x) .
Now, in order to proof Lemma 14, we apply the same approach as in the proof of Lemma 2. Hence, it remains
to adapt the upper bound on E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
to the EXPLORATION PROTOCOL. Note that this is quite simple,
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since due to the linearity of expectation,
E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
≤ β E [∆x˜e]
≤ β n · λ ·
ℓmin |P|
β n
·
1
|P|
·
ℓP − ℓ
+
Q
ℓP
≤ λ ·
ℓ+e
ℓ+Q
· (ℓP − ℓ
+
Q) ,
where we have substituted the migration probability of the protocol and the fact that there are at most n agents
that may sample a path containing e. This proves Equation (2) if λ is chosen small enough. With opposite
signs, the same argument holds if e ∈ P .
Since we have omitted the parameter ν from the protocol, we now need a lower bound on the minimum
improvement that is possible when the system is not yet at an imitation-stable state in order to give an upper
bound on the convergence time. Formally, let
κ = min
x
min
P,Q ∈ P
ℓp(x) > ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )
{ℓP (x)− ℓQ(x+ 1Q − 1P )} .
Theorem 15. Consider a symmetric network congestion game in which all players use the EXPLORATION
PROTOCOL. Let x denote the initial state of the dynamics. Then the dynamics converge to a Nash equilibrium
in expected time
O
(
Φ(x)β n ℓmax
ℓmin κ2
)
.
Proof. In every state which is not a Nash equilibrium there exists an agent currently utilizing path P ∈ P
and a path Q ∈ P such that ℓQ ≤ ℓP − κ. Hence, the expected virtual potential gain is at least
E [VPQ] ≤ −
1
|P|
·
λ |P| ℓmin
β n
·
κ
ℓP
· κ ≤ −
λ ℓmin
β n
·
κ2
ℓmax
,
and the true potential gain is at least half of this. Again, Lemma 20 yields the expected time until the potential
decreases from at most Φ to Φ∗ ≥ 0.
It is obvious that an analogue of Lemmas 2 and 14 also holds for any protocol that is a combination of
the IMITATION PROTOCOL and the EXPLORATION PROTOCOL, e. g., a protocol in which in every round,
every agent executes the one or the other with probability one half. Then, in order to bound the value of
E
[
∆ℓ˜e(∆x˜e)
]
, we must make a case differentiation based on whether proportional or uniform sampling
dominates the probability that other agents migrate towards resource e. Such a protocol combines the advan-
tages of the IMITATION PROTOCOL and the EXPLORATION PROTOCOL: In the long run, it converges to a
Nash equilibrium, and reaches an approximate equilibrium as quickly as stated by Theorem 7 (up to a factor
of 2).
7 Conclusion
We have proposed and analyzed a natural protocol based on imitating profitable strategies for distributed self-
ish agents in symmetric congestion games. If agents use our IMITATION PROTOCOL, the resulting dynamics
converge rapidly to approximate equilibria, in which only a small fraction of players have latency significantly
above or below the average. In addition, in finite time the dynamics converges to an imitation-stable state,
in which no player can improve its latency by more than ν by imitating a different player. The IMITATION
PROTOCOL and the concept of an imitation-stable state have the drawback that dynamics can stabilize in a
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quite disadvantegous situation, e.g. when all players play the same expensive strategy. This is due to the fact
that the strategy space is essentially restricted to the current strategy choices of the agents. Strategies that
might be attractive and offer large latency gain are “lost” once no player uses them anymore. For singleton
congestion games we showed that this event becomes unlikely to occur as the number of players increases.
Then, by removing parameter ν from the protocol, the dynamics become likely to converge to Nash equilibria.
Another approach to avoid losing strategies is to include exploration of the strategy space. Towards this end,
we can use an EXPLORATION PROTOCOL, in which players sample from the strategy space directly and then
migrate with a certain probability. If every player uses a suitably designed EXPLORATION PROTOCOL (or
any random combination of EXPLORATION PROTOCOL and IMITATION PROTOCOL), then the dynamics are
always guaranteed to converge to a Nash equilibrium. However, acquiring information about possible strate-
gies and their benefits might be a complex and costly process in practice, and hence such an action should
be invoked only rarely. In addition, exploration requires small migration probabilities, because the danger of
overshooting is more severe. Thus, on the downside, if the EXPLORATION PROTOCOL is used exclusively,
this results in significantly larger convergence times.
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A Appendix
A.1 Useful Facts
Throughout the technical part of this paper, we will apply the following two Chernoff bounds.
Fact 16 (Chernoff, see [19]). LetX be a sum of Bernoulli variables. Then, P [X ≥ k · E [X ]] ≤ e−E[X] k·(ln k−1),
and, for k ≥ 4 > e4/3, P [X ≥ k · E [X ]] ≤ e− 14 E[X] k lnk. Equivalently, for k ≥ 4E [X ], P [X ≥ k] ≤
e−
1
4 k ln(k/E[X])
.
The following fact yields a linear approximation of the exponential function.
Fact 17. For any r > 0 and x ∈ [0, r], it holds that (ex − 1) ≤ x · er−1r .
Proof. The function exp(x) − 1 is convex and it goes through the points (0, 0) and (r, er − 1), as does the
function x · e
r−1
r .
Fact 18. For every c ∈]0, 1[ it holds
∞∑
k=0
ck =
c
1− c
∞∑
k=l
ck =
cl
1− c
Fact 19 (Jensen’s Inequality). Let f : R→ R be a convex function, and let a1, . . . , ak, x1, . . . , xk ∈ R. Then
f
(∑k
i=1 aixi∑k
i=1 ai
)
≤
∑k
i=1 aif(xi)∑k
i=1 ai
.
If f(x) = x2, then (∑k
i=1 aixi∑k
i=1 ai
)2
≤
∑k
i=1 ai(xi)
2∑k
i=1 ai
⇔
1∑k
i=1 ai
·
(
k∑
i=1
aixi
)2
≤
k∑
i=1
aif(xi) .
Lemma 20 ([14]). Let X0, X1, . . . denote a sequence of non-negative random variables and assume that for
all i ≥ 0
E [Xi | Xi−1 = xi−1] ≤ xi−1 − 1
and let τ denote the first time t such that Xt = 0. Then,
E [τ | X0 = x0] ≤ x0 .
Lemma 21 ([14]). Let X0, X1, . . . denote a sequence of non-negative random variables and assume that for
all i ≥ 0 E [Xi | Xi−1 = xi−1] ≤ xi−1 · α for some constant α ∈ (0, 1). Furthermore, fix some constant
x∗ ∈ (0, x0] and let τ be the random variable that describes the smallest t such that Xt ≤ x∗. Then,
E [τ | X0 = x0] ≤
2
log(1/α)
· log
(x0
x∗
)
.
Again, as a consequence of Lemma 20 the expected time until the potential decreases from at most Φ to Φ
can be found in the appendix, and which is proved, e. g., in [14].
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